

**Security Council**

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**Identical letters dated 27 November 2017 from the Chargé
d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the
President of the Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the position of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the forty-fifth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015) and 2332 (2016) (S/2017/982).

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates the concerns that it raised in its responses to previous reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the aforementioned Security Council resolutions. It stresses that the current report, despite some improvements, is still in dire need of greater clarity, transparency and professionalism in order to be credible. It also stresses that in preparing their reports, the authors should exhibit greater respect for the provisions of the above-mentioned United Nations resolutions, and in particular the principles of full commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic and the provision of humanitarian support to all those in need within the Syrian Arab Republic, wherever located, without politicization or selectivity.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic also draws attention to the following:

Like those before it, the current report is seriously flawed in that its authors have relied on politicized sources, referred to in the report as "open sources", that have no credibility and are unidentified, while they ignore not only reliable Government sources but even reports of United Nations representatives operating in Syria in which they acknowledge the efforts of the Syrian Government, its cooperation on humanitarian relief and the facilities that it provides for their work.

The report acknowledges that the United Nations has successfully delivered humanitarian assistance to millions of people in need within Syria, which would not have happened but for the facilities provided by the Syrian State and its institutions.

The Syrian Government deplores the continuing focus of the authors of the report on the humanitarian convoys operated by United Nations agencies in Syria and their insistence on overlooking the convoys being operated by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent in cooperation with other entities, including the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The Syrian Government regrets that the authors of the report speak of what they call "administrative impediments and deliberate restrictions imposed [...] by the parties to the conflict", saying that they impede humanitarian access to areas of



instability. In this context, it affirms that it facilitates such access in every possible way, provided that the assistance is intended for Syrian civilians in need and that arrangements for its delivery are made in accordance with the applicable Syrian laws and regulations.

Despite their apparent willingness to turn over a new page in cooperation with the Syrian Government, the authors of the report are still periodically using it as an opportunity to relay unfounded claims and allegations with no basis in fact, in order to tarnish the image and undermine the efforts of the Syrian Government and serve the political objectives of certain States that have a harmful influence within the United Nations. Those objectives include promoting the idea that there is an "urgent need" to renew resolution 2165 (2014) and portraying it as a critical element of the humanitarian response in Syria.

The Government regrets that Secretariat officials continue to overuse the phrase "besieged areas" and provide misleading information about the situation in eastern Ghutah in Rif Dimashq, disregarding the fact that the inhabitants of eastern Ghutah are besieged from within by various armed terrorist groups who use civilians as human shields and seize, monopolize and distribute humanitarian aid to their supporters or sell it at extortionate prices to those in need, as happened previously in the eastern districts of Aleppo.

The Syrian Government rejects the Secretariat's continued promotion of cross-border assistance and asserts that such assistance is ineffective, with most of it falling into the hands of armed terrorist groups deployed in the targeted areas. The United Nations itself and the States seeking to renew resolution 2165 (2014) are well aware of this fact. The Syrian Government reiterates that the United Nations Monitoring Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot verify that such assistance is reaching the Syrian civilians for whom it is intended. We also remind you that the Bab al-Hawa, Bab al-Salamah and Ramtha crossings are entry points for arms, materiel and ammunition being smuggled to armed terrorist groups in Syria. The Government therefore strongly rejects the authors' continued bias towards, and praise of, Turkey and Jordan when discussing the delivery of cross-border assistance.

The Syrian Government reiterates that the Syrian Arab Red Crescent stands ready to monitor the delivery of cross-border humanitarian assistance to its intended recipients, which is an offer that the Secretariat has previously refused.

The Syrian Government once again condemns the fact that the authors of the report have ignored the blatant Turkish intervention in Syria and occupation of part of its territory, and reiterates its call to the Security Council to fulfil its responsibility to put an end to that occupation.

The Syrian Government insists that the authors of the report should tell Member States the truth about the substantial progress achieved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to its intended recipients, which is thanks to the liberation by the Syrian Government and its allies of most of Syrian territory from the abomination of terrorism.

The Syrian Government categorically rejects the continued bias shown by the authors of the report towards the so-called international coalition and its members, which they do by simply listing the number of coalition air strikes on Syrian towns and failing to mention the coalition's acknowledgement that these strikes have caused hundreds of civilian deaths. The report furthermore avoids holding the coalition to account for the destruction it has inflicted on the city of Raqqah, for the massacres it has committed there and for its use of internationally proscribed weapons in Syria, as well as for other violations of international law, international

humanitarian law and human rights that constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. It reiterates its call for the dissolution of this illegal coalition and the immediate cessation of its crimes against Syrians.

It is unfortunate that the authors of the report, notwithstanding frequent calls from the Syrian Government and members of the Security Council, are still failing to fulfil their responsibility to give the global public a true picture of the economic and humanitarian suffering caused by the unilateral coercive economic measures imposed on Syria by the United States of America, the European Union and other States. Those measures have had numerous adverse consequences, especially in the medical sector, affecting even the activities of United Nations agencies and foreign non-governmental organizations operating in Syria, and have led to the suspension of projects vital to responding to the needs of Syrians.

The Syrian Government stresses that United Nations officials working in Syria should have nothing to do with any separatist entities, illegal "local councils" or unlicensed civil associations. It also calls on the United Nations and its agencies to refrain from all use of the Fish Khabur crossing and not to cooperate with any organizations that have illegally entered Syrian territory via that crossing.

The Syrian Government stands by its position rejecting the continued efforts of the authors of the report to legitimize the terrorist groups deployed in Syria by using illegal designations for them, such as "non-State armed opposition" or "local authorities in areas controlled by non-State armed opposition groups". It also rejects the failure of the authors of the report to acknowledge that the so-called "non-State opposition groups" in the eastern Ghutah, Jawbar and Yarmuk areas are the Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorist organizations or groups associated with them. The Syrian Government believes that the authors of the report should be held to account for their irresponsible approach, which is akin to attempts by terrorist organizations, such as the terrorist Levant Liberation Organization (Nusrah Front), to legitimize their presence in certain parts of Syria by calling their headquarters and affiliated entities "charitable associations".

The Syrian Government regrets the failure of the authors of the report, when stating that the humanitarian response plan was only 43 per cent funded, to acknowledge that donors are not meeting their financial commitments and are setting politicized conditions for the financing of international organizations operating in Syria, which is the principal obstacle that stands in the way of the humanitarian response to Syrians in need and Government plans aimed at rehabilitating infrastructure and returning refugees to their regions once security and stability are restored.

As to the number of international non-governmental organizations permitted to operate in the Syrian Arab Republic, there are to date 27 of them and not 23, as stated in the report. Applications submitted by other organizations for authorization to operate in Syria are being considered.

The Syrian Government reaffirms its position concerning the International Criminal Court and the calls made for the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to be referred to that Court. It stresses that the jurisdiction of the Court does not apply to the situation in Syria and, moreover, that the Court has lost all credibility and has been transformed into a political tool used by certain parties to attack specific States for sordid political ends that have nothing to do with the requirements of justice. The Syrian Government also reiterates what it stated in its letter to the Secretary-General (A/71/799) regarding the serious legal flaws in General Assembly resolution 71/248 concerning the "international investigation and accountability mechanism".

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms its long-standing position that the crisis in Syria requires a political solution based on intra-Syrian

dialogue under Syrian leadership without foreign intervention and without preconditions. We remind you that the success of the political process and any significant improvement in the humanitarian situation will depend, above all, on creating a climate conducive to a serious and non-politicized international and regional commitment to fighting terrorism. The Syrian Government also stresses that it has played a constructive role in the success of the Astana and Geneva meetings and that it is ready to attend the Syrian national dialogue congress to be held in the Russian city of Sochi.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic once again calls on the Security Council to prevail on the States that support and finance armed terrorist groups to refrain from so doing, in implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions on combating terrorism and the financing thereof, in particular resolutions 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015). Compliance with and enforcement of those resolutions is the key to resolving the situation in Syria and delivering full humanitarian assistance to those in need in Syria.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mounzer **Mounzer**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Minister Plenipotentiary

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
27 November 2017

Original: English

**Letter dated 20 November 2017 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 2379 (2017), in which the Security Council requested me to establish an investigative team, headed by a special adviser, to support domestic efforts to hold Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) accountable, by collecting, preserving and storing evidence in Iraq of acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed by the terrorist group ISIL in Iraq.

Pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 2379 (2017), the Security Council further requested me to submit for its approval, within 60 days, terms of reference acceptable to the Government of Iraq, in order to ensure that the investigative team can fulfil its mandate. The deadline for submission is 20 November 2017.

The Secretariat has prepared draft terms of reference and has discussed them with representatives of the Government of Iraq. The discussions have been positive and have proceeded in a very cooperative spirit. Substantial progress has been made on the terms of reference and most of the technical questions have been resolved. However, owing to the complexity of some of the issues, the discussions have yet to result in an agreed text of the terms of reference. In particular, it has not yet been possible to resolve an issue concerning the sharing of evidence by the investigative team in respect of any criminal proceedings in which capital punishment could be imposed or carried out.

I therefore wish to request an extension of the deadline for the submission of the terms of reference to the Security Council until 20 December 2017 in order to conclude the ongoing discussions with the Government of Iraq.

I would be grateful if you could bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) António Guterres





Security Council

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27 November 2017

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Letter dated 27 November 2017 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 20 November 2017 (S/2017/989) concerning the submission of the terms of reference requested in paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2379 (2017) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council.

The members of the Security Council have taken note of the request contained in your letter that the time frame for the submission of the terms of reference be extended. They look forward to the submission of the terms of reference by 13 December 2017.

(Signed) Sebastiano **Cardi**
President of the Security Council



**Security Council**

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**Identical letters dated 27 November 2017 from the Chargé
d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab
Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
and the President of the Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, and in reply to the letter dated 14 November 2017 from Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, addressed to the members of the Security Council, to which was annexed what the letter calls "additional responses of Mr. Edmond Mulet, Head of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, to questions addressed to him by members of the Security Council concerning the seventh report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, which was presented to him on 7 November 2017", I should like to draw your attention to the following.

First of all, the Syrian Arab Republic affirms that it has fulfilled all of its obligations under its membership of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and that it has demonstrated cooperation and reacted positively and without hesitation to all the working requirements of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission and likewise the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. It also recalls that it has fully and irrevocably abandoned its chemical weapons programme pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which it acceded in 2013.

The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that the investigations conducted by the Fact-Finding Mission and the Joint Investigative Mechanism thus far give no indication that minimum standards of credibility, professionalism and work are being met. Their conclusions and findings are consequently flawed and fail to portray the reality of what took place. The Syrian Arab Republic notes in particular that those investigations were not carried out on the ground, relying instead on false claims and evidence, open sources and fabricated testimonies provided by the same armed terrorist groups and external actors hostile to Syria that fabricated the Khan Shaykhun and other incidents.

The Syrian Arab Republic underlines the established fact that the Syrian Arab Army and its allied and supporting forces have never used any internationally proscribed weapons in even the fiercest of battles against armed terrorist groups, whereas the so-called international coalition led by the United States of America has used white phosphorus in many Syrian regions and towns, in particular in the city of Raqqah, before the eyes of the entire world.



The Syrian Arab Republic considers the use of internationally proscribed chemical weapons by any party, in any place and at any time, to be unethical and unjustified in all circumstances.

The Syrian Arab Republic will present below scientific and legal evidence disproving the claims made in the responses of Mr. Edmond Mulet, Head of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, set out in the above-mentioned letter of Ms. Nakamitsu. The Syrian Arab Republic furthermore still rejects what is stated in the seventh report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism concerning the Khan Shaykhun incident and will continue to do so because it constitutes an attempt by the Mechanism to mislead the Security Council and the international community in its entirety.

I. Concerning Mr. Mulet's response to the first question: Mr. Mulet, Head of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, contends that various terms, such as "possible", "probable" and "unlikely", among others, are commonly used in technical reports in the context of assessing whether an incident is likely to have occurred. He also contends that scientific experts systematically use these terms for similar purposes. Mr. Mulet furthermore states in the same response that the Joint Investigative Mechanism has accurately reflected the observations made by scientific, forensic and other technical experts.

In reply to these contentions, the Syrian Arab Republic believes the claim that a scientific approach was used in the investigations conducted by the Joint Investigative Mechanism and the actual use of that approach in a precise and pragmatic manner are two different matters. In making that claim, the Joint Investigative Mechanism has left itself wide open to challenge concerning its methodology, analysis, data and maintenance of the chain of custody for evidence, as well as concerning the accuracy of its findings. Further light still is continuing to be shed on the entire working method and approach of the Joint Investigative Mechanism by experts and specialists whose methodologies, analyses and assessments give them credibility by meeting standards that are lacking in the Mechanism's seventh report. In this regard, published reports and studies by experts from various States, including Western States such as the United States and the United Kingdom, have shown the evidence and claims contained in the Mechanism's report to be false and its findings to be incorrect. In particular, some of these experts, unlike the Mechanism, used robust scientific methodologies and theories as a basis for considering all possibilities and hypotheses, disproving several matters in connection with the testimonies and evidence on which the Mechanism relied, with the result that their findings are completely at odds with those of the Mechanism.

This not only confirms that the Joint Investigative Mechanism is unprofessional but also invalidates the outcomes reached with a degree of "confidence", as claimed in the previous report. It furthermore reinforces the challenge to the Mechanism's work, to the line of the investigation and analysis, and to the resulting weak conclusions. In short, such an important, sensitive and grave issue must be judged on the basis of certainty and decisive answers, and not on doubt and estimation.

II. Concerning Mr. Mulet's response to the second question: The Head of the Joint Investigative Mechanism claims that what they call "witnesses" saw or heard aircraft circling above Khan Shaykhun.

Needless to say, reliance on such circumstantial and flimsy testimonies that are unsupported by any firm criminal evidence is astonishing and furthermore unacceptable, both scientifically and criminally. The seventh report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism nonetheless relies on such circumstantial evidence from witnesses presented by the Nusra Front terrorist organization. The worst thing, however, is the glaring contradiction between these false testimonies and the findings set out in para. 93 (b) of annex II to the seventh report itself (S/2017/904), which

conclude that "an aircraft of the Syrian Arab Republic" was flying outside Khan Shaykhun and not above it.

To include such false and fabricated information in a report that should adhere fully to the highest scientific and criminal standards confirms that, from the outset, the work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism has been conducted under political pressure from the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. It also confirms that the Mechanism's Leadership Panel was compelled to seek, in any form or manner, to condemn the Syrian Arab Republic, even if it meant neglecting all scientific and technical standards in its work or abandoning all of the moral values taken for granted in the work of every United Nations or international body conducting such a serious and crucial investigation.

III. Concerning Mr. Mulet's response to the third and fourth questions: The experts' findings on which the seventh report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism relied concerning the crater are completely erroneous, contrary to fact, and not in keeping with scientific and criminal research methods. To say that the appearance of the crater was consistent with the impact from a relatively large object travelling at high velocity is utterly wrong, as the crater should then have been conical in shape and much deeper, the earth would presumably have been disturbed at the side and the edges of the pavement would have looked different. As to the debris and damage in the immediate surroundings, they could have been produced by a guided or an unguided bomb. The same applies to the fragments, which should supposedly be propelled at speed. The crucial and most important question to which the Joint Investigative Mechanism has not as yet provided any answer relates to the front and tail of the bomb and to its other parts, all of which should have been next to the crater.

Mr. Mulet claims in the report and in his recent answers that the experts examined the munition fragments observed in the crater, but he neither mentions nor justifies why the fragments were not handed over to the Joint Investigative Mechanism or the Fact-Finding Mission for analysis. Nor does he mention or justify his failure to take on board the observations made concerning the alleged fragments in the national report prepared by the Syrian Arab Republic.

It is an established scientific fact that, if an aerial chemical system is used, the tail and mixing mechanism ought to be found in the place where it falls, even if at a distance of 300 metres, as Mr. Mulet, Head of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, supposes. Where, therefore, are these remnants? Why has the Joint Investigative Mechanism failed in its seventh report to explain the absence of these remnants? Furthermore, how did the experts on whom the Joint Investigative Mechanism relied conclude that the "large object" was part of the casing of an aerial bomb measuring between 300 and 500 mm in diameter? This finding is mistaken and is neither scientific nor realistic. The more likely scientific hypothesis is rather that this object was part of a pipe with a relatively small diameter and not one of that size.

IV. Concerning Mr. Mulet's response to the fifth question: Mr. Mulet's continuing insistence is such as to arouse suspicion that the scientific facts are being disregarded. He persists in claiming that the sarin used in Khan Shaykhun and the impurities identified in the samples from Khan Shaykhun cannot be replicated or can belong only to the stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic. Here, we would first remind Mr. Mulet of the fact that he ignores, which is that the Syrian chemical stockpile has been permanently disposed of and was destroyed aboard the United States vessel *MF Cape Ray* in the Mediterranean Sea.

Concerning sarin gas, it can be produced simply by combining a quantity of methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) with isopropanol (iPrOH). As to the impurities identified in the report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, they can be present where DF is produced by a method other than what the report calls the "Syrian

method". There is, for example, a method of using methyl iodide with trimethyl phosphate or with triisopropyl phosphate and then chlorinating it with thionyl chloride. In other words, the impurities present, which were identified in the analysis report on which Mr. Mulet relies in his seventh report and in his responses, are not limited to the Syrian stockpile, contrary to the Head of the Joint Investigative Mechanism's statement that these impurities are a fingerprint of the Syrian stockpile.

The Syrian Arab Republic again calls on Mr. Mulet not to stoop to misleading the Security Council and the international community by falsely implying that the sample of sarin is, in effect, a DNA fingerprint that could have been manufactured by the Syrian Arab Republic alone.

V. Concerning Mr. Mulet's response to the sixth question: The claim that exposure to sarin causes pupil dilation and constriction is incorrect and inconsistent with the scientific facts. Exposure to this substance causes the pupil only to constrict. It does not cause it to dilate. Hence, the level of exposure to sarin is what determines the level of pupil constriction, not pupil dilation.

VI. Concerning Mr. Mulet's response to the seventh question: The Syrian Arab Republic believes that Mr. Mulet will be unable to answer this question or rather that he does not wish to do so. The straightforward and realistic answer is that the accusation concerning the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic is political and unfounded. The United States, the United Kingdom and France are behind it as part of a campaign to pressure and coerce Syria and its allies in their war on terrorism and armed terrorist groups in Syria, foremost among them the Nusra Front organization, designated by the Security Council as a terrorist entity and recognized in the seventh report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism as being in control of Khan Shaykhun. In other words, the report explicitly states that the party responsible for having prepared, fabricated and transferred evidence to Turkey is the Nusra Front terrorist organization; that the party responsible for having provided the alleged samples to the French, United Kingdom, Turkish and United States intelligence services is the Nusra Front terrorist organization; that the party responsible for having presented witnesses who gave false evidence in the Turkish city of Gaziantep is the Nusra Front terrorist organization; and that the party responsible for having prepared and later covered up and tampered with the crime scene is the Nusra Front terrorist organization.

The Syrian Arab Army, backed by allied and supporting forces, has long been achieving major victories and successes over armed terrorist groups. It has no need to use internationally proscribed weapons that damage the reputation of Syria and the reputation and status of its army. Those who have been using chemical weapons against civilians, children and women since the Khan al-Asal, Ghutah and Khan Shaykhun incidents are the same armed terrorist groups that are seeking to achieve well-known objectives, in particular those of harming the Syrian Arab Army and exerting pressure on Syria and its allies in their war on the terror perpetrated by these groups.

In sum, the use of chemical weapons is a strategy resorted to when military forces are under heavy attack and fail to open gaps, and not when they are advancing and achieving successive major victories. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that Mr. Mulet should answer this question and determine who benefits from the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria so that the picture is clear to him and to the experts and investigators and they realize that their work was proceeding in completely the wrong direction.

VII. Concerning Mr. Mulet's response to the eighth question: Mr. Mulet is still unable to provide an explanation concerning the decision of the Joint Investigative Mechanism not to visit the site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun, which

is to say the "scene of the crime", and is still feebly defending the claim that an impartial and full crime investigation might be conducted remotely.

The United Nations Department of Safety and Security has confirmed that such a visit might take place. It also transpires that Riyad Hijab has undertaken to the Fact-Finding Mission and the Joint Investigative Mechanism to provide safe access to the town of Khan Shaykhun and stated that the Mechanism's team may visit the site of the incident once the agreement of the armed terrorist groups has been obtained through the entities and Governments supporting them. It is furthermore reasonable to assume that it is in the interest of these terrorist groups to facilitate access to the site for the Joint Investigative Mechanism rather than to obstruct it.

This dubious matter raises a number of question marks about the conduct and working methodology of the Mechanism's team. The answers are patently evident, however. The Joint Investigative Mechanism did not get the green light to visit Khan Shaykhun because this visit would have revealed the truth and demolished the fake evidence and false testimonies relied on in the Mechanism's seventh report. It would also have exposed who are the armed terrorist groups using chemical weapons in Syria and who are the Governments and external actors directing and supporting them and supplying them with chemical weapons.

VIII. Concerning Mr. Mulet's response to the ninth question: Mr. Mulet still insists on stating that the aim of the Joint Investigative Mechanism's team of experts who visited the Sha'irat airbase was not to collect samples. This again strongly begs the question of why the collection of samples was not an aim of the visit to the Sha'irat airbase when United States military aircraft had struck that airbase on the pretext that the alleged chemical weapons attack on Khan Shaykhun had been launched directly from it. The simple answer is that the Joint Investigative Mechanism could not have taken samples from that airbase without exposing the falseness of the United States allegations that led to the attack on the airbase. Any analysis of samples would have established that there was no trace of sarin or any other toxic chemical substance. The second question is why the United States did not provide the Joint Investigative Mechanism with data and information about the whereabouts of sarin gas in the Sha'irat airbase, given that it had attacked it on the pretext that sarin was present. The likewise simple answer is that the United States itself was certain that there was no sarin in the Sha'irat airbase.

IX. Concerning Mr. Mulet's response to the tenth question: Mr. Mulet's response is a clear attempt to manipulate the truth and avoid addressing the findings of the Syrian national committee concerning the Khan Shaykhun incident, the report of which was given to Mr. Mulet on 16 August 2017. He is seeking to return to 2016 and demanding the findings of the national investigation into incidents prior to the Khan Shaykhun incident, despite the fact that, during his own visit and those of his team to Syria, the need to hand over to him the findings of any previous investigations was never even mentioned when they met with Syrian political, military and technical officials. On the contrary, he and his colleagues constantly applauded the cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic with the Mechanism. In short, Mr. Mulet is aware that the reference to the fact that the findings of the national investigation have not been received, irrespective of the context in the report, suggests to the recipient that the Syrian Government has not provided the findings of its investigations into the matters under review in the report.

X. Concerning Mr. Mulet's response to the eleventh question: The response to this question is no different than the ones before it in that it simply comprises attempts by Mr. Mulet to skirt around the seventh report's lack of credibility and professionalism, as well as around the politicization of the Mechanism's work. It is clearly obvious that the task assigned to the Head of the Joint Investigative

Mechanism and his team was to level an accusation against the Syrian Government and not to seek out the truth. Although these concerns were harboured by the Syrian Arab Republic and several other States, in particular the Russian Federation, no one anticipated that the Mechanism's team would venture, in the absence of evidence, to level such a baseless accusation against Syria. Even before the seventh report was issued, moreover, various States members of the Security Council expressed their firm belief that Mr. Mulet would be unable to reach decisive conclusions.

In a nutshell, Mr. Mulet and his Mechanism refused to go to Khan Shaykhun, refused to take samples from the Sha'irat airbase and relied on evidence, information and scenarios presented by the United States, United Kingdom, French and Turkish intelligence services. They relied on false witnesses and evidence tampered with by the Nusra Front terrorist organization, convinced themselves of the lie that is the early warning system overseen by the "White Helmets", which operate under the wing of the Nusra Front organization, and ultimately invented their own new method of criminal and scientific investigation based on everything except professionalism, credibility and the rules and standards for maintaining the chain of custody for evidence.

The fundamental purpose of this letter is to respond to the misinformation that the Head of the terminated Joint Investigative Mechanism is spreading within the United Nations and putting before the international community and the Security Council. Asserting with full credibility and confidence that it possesses no chemical weapons of any kind, the Syrian Arab Republic appeals to the States Member of the United Nations and members of the Security Council that still attach importance and accord respect to the Charter and its principles to address the attempts to repeat the major disaster that was perpetrated by the United States of America against Iraq on the basis of similar allegations and that will remain a scandal in the history of our Organization and in the history of international relations.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mounzer Mounzer
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Minister Plenipotentiary



Security Council

Distr.: General
1 December 2017
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 27 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 21–27 November 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) V. Nebenzia

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Annex to the letter dated 27 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (21 November 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire: three in Aleppo Governorate and two in Damascus Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported 10 violations: 7 in Damascus Governorate and 3 in Aleppo Governorate.

Most incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusra Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours.

In total, 1,681 humanitarian operations have been carried out, with a total cargo weight of 2,300.7 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 71 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 65,099 residents.

The passage of three humanitarian convoys was assured to Muzayrib in Dar'a Governorate.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,276.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah Governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (22 November 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported one incident of gunfire in Aleppo Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported three violations in Damascus Governorate.

Most incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusra Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours in Rasm al-Alam, Aleppo Governorate, and in Dayr al-Zawr, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate. Food with a total cargo weight of 15 tons was delivered to the local population.

In total, 1,682 humanitarian operations have been carried out, with a total cargo weight of 2,301.6 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 238 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 65,337 residents.

The passage of one United Nations humanitarian convoy was assured to Dayr al-Zawr in Dayr al-Zawr Governorate. Food and medicine with a total cargo weight of 66 tons was delivered to the local population.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,276.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah Governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (23 November 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported nine incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: five in Aleppo, three in Damascus and one in Ladhqiyyah.

The Turkish representative office has reported four violations in the following Governorates: two in Damascus, one in Aleppo and one in Homs.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusra Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation over the past 24 hours in Talfita, Damascus Governorate. Food with a total cargo weight of 1.7 tons was delivered to the local population.

In total, 1,683 humanitarian operations have been carried out, with a total cargo weight of 2,303.3 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 164 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 65,501 residents.

The passage of four humanitarian convoys was assured.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, two ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with Hawz in Homs Governorate and with Hikkiyah in Idlib Governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,278.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus and Qunaytirah Governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (24 November 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: three in Aleppo, two in Damascus and one in Ladhīqiyah.

The Turkish representative office has reported nine violations in Damascus Governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusra Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation over the past 24 hours in Dayr al-Zawr, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate. Food with a total cargo weight of 2.4 tons was delivered to the local population.

In total, 1,684 humanitarian operations have been carried out, with a total cargo weight of 2,317.8 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 128 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 65,629 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,278.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus and Qunaytirah Governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (25 November 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported seven incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: three in Homs, two in Damascus, one in Aleppo and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported two violations in Damascus Governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusra Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation over the past 24 hours in Marran, Aleppo Governorate. Food with a total cargo weight of 0.8 tons was delivered to the local population.

In total, 1,685 humanitarian operations have been carried out, with a total cargo weight of 2,318.7 tons.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 65,629 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours three ceasefire agreements have been signed with Mudawwarah, Jabal al-Mudawwarah and Mushayrifat al Buwaydatayn in Aleppo Governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,281.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus and Qunaytirah Governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (26 November 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: two in Damascus, one in Aleppo, one in Homs and one in Ladhikiyah.

The Turkish representative office has reported six violations: four in Damascus Governorate and two in Aleppo Governorate.

Most incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours.

In total, 1,685 humanitarian operations have been carried out, with a total cargo weight of 2,318.7 tons.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 65,629 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,281.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus and Qunaytirah Governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (27 November 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has not reported any incidents of gunfire.

The Turkish representative office has reported five incidents of gunfire in Damascus Governorate.

Most incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours.

In total, 1,685 humanitarian operations have been carried out, with a total cargo weight of 2,318,656 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 166 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 65,795 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours two ceasefire agreements have been signed with Mushayrifat al-Halaj and Uwaynat al-Saghirah in Aleppo Governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,283.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus and Qunaytirah Governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.



Security Council

Distr.: General
8 December 2017

Original: English

Egypt, Ethiopia and Senegal: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Region,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all States in the region and emphasizing the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation,

Recalling that the Governments of the region bear the primary responsibility to protect civilians within their territories and subject to their jurisdiction, including protection from crimes against humanity and war crimes,

Expressing concern over the significant increase in the numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Great Lakes region over the past year, totalling now more than 7 million internally displaced persons and 3.5 million refugees, and stressing the link between forced displacement and instability and insecurity in the region,

Reiterating its deep concern regarding the security and humanitarian crisis in the DRC exacerbated by destabilizing activities of foreign and domestic armed groups, stressing the importance of neutralizing armed groups in the DRC, and recognizing the importance of efforts of the Forces Armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and the United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), including by conducting joint operations, in accordance with its mandate as stipulated in resolution 2348 (2017),

Welcoming the credible and peaceful conduct of elections in some States of the Great Lakes region, and noting, however, that recent and ongoing electoral processes in some countries of the Great Lakes region raise deep concerns about the risk of instability, insecurity, the potential for violence, human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law and further displacement of people which impact all countries of the Great Lakes region,

Expressing concern at the illicit flow of weapons within and into the DRC, including their recirculation to and between armed groups, in violation of resolution 2360 (2017), and declaring its determination to continue to monitor closely the implementation of the arms embargo and other measures set out by its resolutions concerning the DRC, and acknowledging in this respect the important contribution the Council-mandated arms embargo makes to countering the illicit transfer of small



arms and light weapons in the DRC, and in supporting post-conflict peacebuilding, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and security sector reform,

Expressing further concern at the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources by armed groups among others, and the negative impact of armed conflict on protected natural areas, which undermines lasting peace and development for the DRC, and *encouraging* the Government of the DRC to strengthen efforts to safeguard those areas,

Recalling the linkage between the illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources, including poaching and illegal trafficking of wildlife, and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the major factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region, and *encouraging* the continuation of the regional efforts of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the governments involved against the illegal exploitation of natural resources, and *stressing*, in this regard, the importance of regional cooperation and deepening economic integration with special consideration for the exploitation of natural resources,

Reaffirming that the Peace, Security and Cooperation (PSC) Framework remains an essential mechanism to achieve durable peace and stability in the DRC and the Region, *noting and supporting* the renewed commitment of its signatories towards its full implementation, and *reiterating* its call to all signatories to fulfil promptly, fully and in good faith their respective commitments under this Framework in order to address the root causes of conflict and put an end to recurring cycles of violence, and promote lasting regional development,

Recalling the strategic importance of the implementation of the PSC Framework, and *welcoming* the commitment of the AU Peace and Security Council, as expressed in its communique of 7 November 2017, to ensure the implementation of the PSC Framework, and *echoing its call* upon all the signatory states and the Guarantors of the Framework to redouble their efforts, in order to ensure effective implementation of all aspects of the Framework,

Recalling the commitments under the PSC Framework by all States of the region not to interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries, and to neither tolerate nor provide assistance or support of any kind to armed groups, and *reiterating* its strong condemnation of any and all internal or external support to armed groups active in the region, including through financial, logistical or military support, and not to harbour war criminals,

Stressing that the 2006 Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region and the PSC Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region are mutually reinforcing, and are crucial tools to achieve long term peace and prosperity, *emphasizing* that the PSC Framework demonstrates that peace, security and development are interlinked and underscores the importance of strengthening regional cooperation, including the deepening of economic integration,

Mindful that solutions to the prevailing situation in the Great Lakes region should come within a regional perspective, by addressing the root causes of conflicts including their developmental aspects, many of which are regional in nature; with cross-border issues linked to the eastern DRC assuming crucial significance, including the large flows of natural resources, migrants and refugees, and activities of armed groups and criminal networks across the borders,

1. *Welcomes* the renewed commitment of all the signatory states of the PSC Framework towards its full implementation, as expressed in the Communique of the

Eighth High-Level Meeting of the Regional Oversight Mechanism, held in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, on 19 October 2017, *reaffirms* that the PSC Framework remains an essential mechanism to achieve durable peace and stability in the DRC and the Region, and *stresses* in this regard the importance of the signatory States fully implementing their national and regional commitments under the PSC Framework;

2. *Welcomes also* the progress under the Regional Plan of action for the Implementation of the Regional Commitments under the PSC Framework, including the recent activities in the areas of youth and women, combating illegal exploitation of natural resources and judicial cooperation, as well as the endorsement of the updated list of Priority Activities of the Regional Plan of Action;

3. *Encourages* enhanced cooperation among all signatory states of the PSC Framework, with the support of its Guarantors, namely the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the United Nations, towards its full implementation;

4. *Strongly condemns* all armed groups operating in the region and their violations of international humanitarian law, as well as other applicable international law, and abuses of human rights, including attacks on the civilian population, MONUSCO peacekeepers and humanitarian actors, summary executions, sexual and gender-based violence and large scale recruitment and use of children, and *reiterates* that those responsible should be held accountable;

5. *Demands* that all armed groups operating in the DRC, including the FDLR, the ADF, the LRA, cease immediately all forms of violence and other destabilizing activities, including the exploitation of natural resources, and that their members immediately and permanently disband, lay down their arms, and liberate and demobilize all children from their ranks, recalls in this regard its resolution 2360 (2017) renewing the sanctions regime, and *further calls for* disarmament of FDLR active leadership and combatants, who were perpetrators of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, during which Hutu and others who opposed the genocide were also killed, and have continued to promote and commit ethnically-based and other killings in Rwanda and the DRC;

6. *Reiterates* its call to all signatory States under the PSC Framework to redouble their efforts in order to fully and promptly implement their commitments in good faith, including not interfering in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries, neither tolerating nor providing assistance or support of any kind to armed groups, and not harbouring war criminals, and *calls on* the Government of the DRC, which has the primary responsibility for safeguarding the DRC's sovereignty and territorial integrity, to make further progress in implementing its commitments under the PSC Framework, in particular as regards security sector reform, consolidation of State authority, reconciliation, tolerance and democratization;

7. *Calls on* the Government of the DRC, with the support of the countries of the region in line with their commitment under the PSC Framework, and in close collaboration with MONUSCO, including by conducting joint operations in accordance with its mandate as stipulated in resolution 2348 (2017), to vigorously pursue the neutralization of all armed groups still active in the Eastern DRC, and *stresses* the need to protect the civilian population, including through professional, accountable and sustainable security forces, and to carry out operations in strict compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable;

8. *Welcomes* the commitment of the signatory states of the PSC Framework to complete without precondition the repatriation of the FDLR disarmed combatants and former M23 combatants within the shortest time frame possible, *urges* the Governments of the region, with the support of the PSC Guarantors, to strengthen their collaboration to meet the agreed timeframe;

9. *Requests* the Governments of the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda to strengthen their collaboration to ensure the repatriation of former M23 combatants located in their territories consistent with the Nairobi declarations and in line with commitments under the PSC Framework, *calls upon* the Guarantors of PSC framework to continue their engagement with the stakeholders towards the resumption of the joint consultation between the DRC Government and the former M23 leadership initiated in 2016 under the auspices of the Guarantors, and *further urges* the former M23 leadership to cooperate fully with the repatriation of former combatants consistent with its commitment under the Nairobi declaration;

10. *Reiterates* its call for a suitable solution for the relocation of elements of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-in Opposition (SPLM/A-iO) currently present in the DRC, *welcomes* the spirit of collaboration displayed by the Governments of DRC and South Sudan and the progress achieved thus far in this regard with the support of MONUSCO and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, and *calls on* all regional actors and the international community to support these efforts;

11. *Commends* the efforts of the African Union, as well as the subregional organizations in particular ECCAS, EAC, ICGLR and SADC, towards supporting political processes and finding peaceful solutions for the conflict situations in the region;

12. *Urges* continued regional and international support for initiatives aimed at promoting inclusive dialogue amongst national stakeholders and *stresses* the importance of opening political space to enable the full and free participation of peaceful political parties, civil society and the media as well as the full participation of both men and women in the political process, *urges* international and regional support for strengthening and improving capacity for elections and governance in the countries of the region, and *calls on* member states in the Great Lakes region to take steps to ensure that electoral processes promote peace and security through timely, peaceful, inclusive and credible elections, in line with countries' own constitutions and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, as applicable;

13. *Notes* the link between justice and conflict prevention, and *calls upon* all countries in the Great Lakes region to comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and *encourages* them to actively pursue accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law and to effectively support measures of conflict prevention by ending the culture of impunity, and *welcomes* efforts by national governments to reverse such trend;

14. *Shares* the view expressed in the RSF GILR that there is an urgent need to address violence and discrimination against women and girls, including rape and other forms of sexual violence in the Great Lakes region and take into account the link between women's participation in peace and security decision-making, for peace and gender equality;

15. *Supports* the regional initiatives on the issue of gender related violence in armed conflict to influence regional and local decision makers, aimed at the

implementation of the commitments of the Kampala Declaration addressing impunity for gender based crimes at the country level and to improve women's visibility, empowerment and resilience;

16. *Welcomes* measures taken by the Governments in the region to implement the Group of Experts established by resolution 1533 (2004) due diligence guidelines, including adopting the Regional Certification Mechanism of the ICGLR into their national legislation, in accordance with OECD Guidance and international practice, and *further welcomes* the successful organization of the Regional Experts and Stakeholders Consultation on Natural Resources and Good Governance for Sustainable Peace, Development and Transformation of the Great Lakes Region, held in Nairobi on 5 and 6 July 2017, and *notes with encouragement* the increased cooperation between ICGLR and other partners on strengthening the ICGLR Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources;

17. *Stresses* the need to undertake further efforts to cut off financing for armed groups involved in destabilizing activities through the illicit trade of natural resources, including gold or wildlife products, and *encourages* the continuation of efforts by the Governments of the region to address issues of illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources, including holding accountable all those who participate in the illicit trade of natural resources, particularly gold and wildlife products, and *further encourages* enhanced cooperation among the Governments in the region in line with its resolution 2360 (2017);

18. *Stresses* the need to find durable solutions for refugees, internally displaced persons and asylum seekers in the region, the majority of whom are women and children and are especially affected, and *welcomes* the efforts of Governments in the region and of regional and subregional organizations, as well as the hospitality provided by host communities for the millions of displaced people, and *recalls in this regard* obligations of the States in the region under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees;

19. *Urges* the governments of the region, as well as regional and international partners, to continue addressing urgent and drastically increasing humanitarian needs and pursue durable solutions for internally displaced persons, refugees and asylum seekers, *notes* that despite increasing needs, humanitarian appeals remain underfunded across the region, and *urges* international partners, and the donor community at large, to step up their support to humanitarian action in the region and in the DRC;

20. *Underlines* the importance of peacebuilding efforts to address the root causes of conflict through a collaborative approach between the countries in the region and the African Union and African subregional organizations, as well as international partners, and *recognizes*, in this regard, the potential contribution of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), in accordance with its mandate as stipulated in resolutions 1645 (2005) and 2282 (2016);

21. *Recalls* the Regional Strategic Framework for the Great lakes region 2016–2017 (RSF GLR), which outlines the United Nations development approach in support of the implementation of the PSC Framework; and *urges* the donor community to contribute to the implementation of the RSF GLR, as an effective platform for partnership, in support of member states in the national and regional commitments aimed to address the root causes of conflicts, promote economic development and cooperation among countries of the region, as well as strengthening mechanisms and capacities to address cross-border insecurity and trafficking, and bring about durable peace in the Great Lakes region;

22. *Calls on* the United Nations Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region to continue his regional and international engagement in furtherance of peace and stability in the DRC and the region, including through the promotion of timely, credible, and inclusive national elections, regional dialogue and by continuing, in close coordination with the SRSG for the DRC and Head of MONUSCO, to lead, coordinate and assess the implementation of the national and regional commitments under the PSC Framework, as well as to continue his engagement in regional initiatives with key partners to address the underlying root causes of conflict, while avoiding overlapping with other United Nations institutions;

23. *Stresses* the need for deepening cooperation among the Guarantors of the PSC Framework, namely, the UN, AU, the ICGLR and SADC with the core signatory countries of the Framework, to ensure that major regional political and security challenges are addressed in a spirit of cooperation, and to create conditions for sustainable peace, stability and development in the DRC and the Great Lakes region, and for future alignment of the United Nations presence and engagement to this end;

24. *Invites*, in this regard, the Secretary General, to engage in high-level dialogue, in collaboration with the African Union, with the signatory states and Guarantor institutions of the PSC Framework, as well as key regional and international partners, to assess the progress, challenges and shortcomings in the implementation of the Framework, and to present his vision, supported by concrete recommendations, to the Council in his next report, which would mark the fifth anniversary of the signing of the PSC Framework.



Security Council

Distr.: General
28 November 2017

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 7488th meeting, held on 20 July 2015 in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to report at any time any issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments.

Accordingly, the President herewith circulates the report of the Director General dated 13 November 2017 (see annex).



Annex

Letter dated 13 November 2017 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith the document submitted to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the enclosed document to the attention of all members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yukiya Amano

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English,
French, Russian and Spanish]

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), is on the Islamic Republic of Iran's (Iran's) implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and on matters related to verification and monitoring in Iran in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). It also provides information on financial matters, and the Agency's consultations and exchanges of information with the Joint Commission, established by the JCPOA.

B. Background

2. On 14 July 2015, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (E3/EU+3) and Iran agreed on the JCPOA. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015), in which, inter alia, it requested the Director General to "undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA".¹ In August 2015, the Board of Governors authorized the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA, and report accordingly, for the full duration of those commitments in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), subject to the availability of funds and consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices. The Board of Governors also authorized the Agency to consult and exchange information with the Joint Commission, as set out in GOV/2015/53 and Corr. 1.

3. In December 2016 and January 2017, the Director General shared with Member States nine documents,² developed and endorsed by all participants of the Joint Commission, providing clarifications for the implementation of Iran's nuclear-related measures as set out in the JCPOA for its duration.³

4. The estimated cost to the Agency for the implementation of Iran's Additional Protocol and for verifying and monitoring Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA is €9.2 million per annum. For 2017, extrabudgetary funding is

¹ The actions requested of the Director General by the Security Council as contained in resolution 2231 (2015) are set out in GOV/2015/53 and Corr. 1, para. 8.

² Reproduced in INFCIRC/907 and INFCIRC/907/Add.1.

³ GOV/2017/10, para. 3.

necessary for €6.2 million of the €9.2 million.⁴ As of 6 November 2017, €9.7 million of extrabudgetary funding was available to meet the cost of JCPOA-related activities for 2017 and beyond.

5. On 29 October 2017, the Director General met the President of Iran, HE Hassan Rouhani, the Vice-President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), HE Ali Akbar Salehi, and the Foreign Minister of Iran, HE Mohammad Javad Zarif, in Tehran. During these meetings, the Director General stressed the importance of the full implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA.

C. JCPOA Verification and Monitoring Activities

6. Since 16 January 2016 (JCPOA Implementation Day), the Agency has verified and monitored Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments in accordance with the modalities set out in the JCPOA,⁵ consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices, and in an impartial and objective manner.^{6,7} The Agency reports the following for the period since the issuance of the Director General's previous quarterly report.⁸

C.1. Activities Related to Heavy Water and Reprocessing

7. Iran has not pursued the construction of the Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 Reactor) based on its original design.^{9,10} Iran has not produced or tested natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies specifically designed for the support of the IR-40 Reactor as originally designed, and all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies have remained in storage under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 3 and 10).¹¹

8. Iran has continued to inform the Agency about the inventory of heavy water in Iran and the production of heavy water at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP)¹² and allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran's heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced at the HWPP (para. 15). On 6 November 2017, the Agency verified that the plant was in operation and that Iran's stock of heavy water was 114.4 metric tonnes. Throughout the reporting period, Iran had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water (para. 14).

9. Iran has not carried out activities related to reprocessing at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope

⁴ The cost of the provisional application of Iran's Additional Protocol (€3.0 million) is being met from the regular budget (GC(60)/2).

⁵ Including the clarifications referred to in para. 3 of this report.

⁶ GOV/2016/8, para. 6.

⁷ Note by the Secretariat, 2016/Note 5.

⁸ GOV/2017/35.

⁹ The calandria was removed from the reactor and rendered inoperable during preparation for Implementation Day and has been retained in Iran (GOV/INF/2016/1, Arak heavy water research reactor, paras 3(ii) and 3(iii)).

¹⁰ As indicated previously (GOV/2017/24, footnote 10), Iran has changed the name of the facility to the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor.

¹¹ The paragraph references in parentheses throughout Sections C and D of this report correspond to the paragraphs of 'Annex I – Nuclear-related measures' of the JCPOA.

¹² HWPP is a facility for the production of heavy water which, according to the design information provided by Iran to the Agency on 25 January 2016, has a nominal capacity of 16 tonnes of nuclear-grade heavy water per year and an actual capacity of "about 20 tonnes" of nuclear-grade heavy water per year. Iran informed the Agency, in a letter dated 18 June 2017, that the "maximum annual capacity of the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) is 20 Tons".

Production (MIX) Facility or at any of the other facilities it has declared to the Agency (paras 18 and 21).¹³

C.2. Activities Related to Enrichment and Fuel

10. At the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, there have been no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuges installed in 30 cascades, which remain in the configurations in the operating units at the time the JCPOA was agreed (para. 27). Iran has withdrawn 16 IR-1 centrifuges from those held in storage¹⁴ for the replacement of damaged or failed IR-1 centrifuges installed at FEP (para. 29.1).

11. Iran has continued the enrichment of UF₆ at FEP.¹⁵ Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28).

12. Throughout the reporting period, Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). The quantity of 300 kg of UF₆ corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.¹⁶

13. As of 5 November 2017, the quantity of Iran's uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 96.7 kg,¹⁷ based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.¹⁸

14. At the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), 1044 IR-1 centrifuges have been maintained in one wing (Unit 2) of the facility (para. 46), of which 1034 IR-1 centrifuges have remained installed in six cascades. On 30 October 2017, the Agency verified that ten IR-1 centrifuges had been removed from the six cascades, modified and installed separately for the purpose of conducting "initial research and R&D activities related to stable isotope production".^{19,20} Throughout the reporting period, Iran has not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development (R&D) activities, and there has not been any nuclear material at the plant (para. 45).

15. All centrifuges and associated infrastructure in storage have remained under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 29, 47, 48 and 70).²¹ The Agency has continued to have regular access to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all of FEP and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), and performed daily access upon Agency request (para. 71). The Agency has also continued to have regular access to FFEP, including daily access upon Agency request (para. 51).

16. Iran has conducted its enrichment activities in line with its long-term enrichment and R&D enrichment plan, as provided to the Agency on 16 January 2016 (para. 52).

¹³ Including hot cells at TBR and the MIX facility and shielded cells, referred to in the decision of the Joint Commission of 14 January 2016 (INFCIRC/907).

¹⁴ Para. 15 of this report.

¹⁵ Under the JCPOA, "[f]or 15 years the Natanz enrichment site will be the sole location for all of Iran's uranium enrichment related activities including safeguarded R&D" (para. 72).

¹⁶ Considering the standard atomic weight of uranium and fluorine.

¹⁷ Comprising 85.9 kg of uranium in the form of UF₆; 1.4 kg of uranium in the form of UO₂; 4.3 kg of uranium in fuel assemblies and rods; 0.3 kg of uranium as hold up in process lines; and 4.8 kg of uranium in liquid and solid scrap.

¹⁸ Decisions of the Joint Commission of 6 January and 18 December 2016 (INFCIRC/907), and 10 January 2017 (INFCIRC/907 Add.1).

¹⁹ GOV/2016-46, para. 12.

²⁰ On 5 September 2017, Iran provided the Agency with updated design information for FFEP, which included a layout of 16 IR-1 centrifuge positions for conducting "Initial Research Setup for Separation of Stable Isotopes" in Unit 2.

²¹ GOV/2016-46, footnote 15.

17. On 12 November 2017, the Agency verified that all irradiated TRR fuel elements in Iran have a measured dose rate of no less than 1 rem/hour (at one metre in air).

18. Iran has not operated any of its declared facilities for the purpose of re-converting fuel plates or scrap into UF₆, nor has it informed the Agency that it has built any new facilities for such a purpose (para. 58).

C.3. Centrifuge Research & Development, Manufacturing and Inventory

19. No enriched uranium has been accumulated through enrichment R&D activities, and Iran's enrichment R&D with and without uranium has been conducted using centrifuges within the limits defined in the JCPOA (paras 32–42).

20. Iran has provided declarations to the Agency of its production and inventory of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and permitted the Agency to verify the items in the inventory (para. 80.1). The Agency has conducted continuous monitoring, including through the use of containment and surveillance measures, and verified that the declared equipment has been used for the production of rotor tubes and bellows to manufacture centrifuges on¹ for the activities specified in the JCPOA (para. 80.2). Iran has not produced any IR-1 centrifuges to replace those that have been damaged or failed (para. 62).

21. All declared rotor tubes, bellows and rotor assemblies have been under continuous monitoring by the Agency, including those rotor tubes and bellows manufactured since Implementation Day (para. 70). Iran has manufactured rotor tubes using carbon fibre that has been sampled and tested by the Agency, all of which has been subject to Agency containment and surveillance measures.^{22,23}

D. Transparency Measures

22. Iran has continued to permit the Agency to use on-line enrichment monitors and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors, and to facilitate the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices (para. 67.1). Iran has issued long-term visas to Agency inspectors designated for Iran as requested by the Agency, provided proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in Iran (para. 67.2).

23. Iran has continued to permit the Agency to monitor – through measures agreed with Iran, including containment and surveillance measures – that all uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced in Iran or obtained from any other source is transferred to the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan (para. 68). Iran also provided the Agency with all information necessary to enable the Agency to verify the production of UOC and the inventory of UOC produced in Iran or obtained from any other source (para. 69).

E. Other Relevant Information

24. Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force. The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran's declarations under the

²² Decision of the Joint Commission of 14 January 2016 (INFCIRC/907).

²³ GOV 2016/46, para. 18.

Additional Protocol, and has conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit.

25. In accordance with the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement, Iran informed the Agency, in a letter dated 29 October 2017, of its decision to "design and construct a critical facility (Light Water Critical Reactor) at AEOI site for research purposes in near future" and provided preliminary design information for the facility.²⁴

26. The Agency's verification and monitoring of Iran's other JCPOA nuclear-related commitments continues, including those set out in Sections D, E, S and T of Annex I of the JCPOA.

27. During this reporting period, the Agency attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV – Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

F. Summary

28. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs) declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for Iran remained ongoing.

29. Since Implementation Day, the Agency has been verifying and monitoring the implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA.

30. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

²⁴ The preliminary design information indicates that the nominal power of the facility is 1 kW thermal and that the enrichment level of the fuel to be used in the facility is up to 3.67% U-235.